Three experiments examined the role of the dorsal hippocampus (dHIPP) in occasion setting with diffuse contextual and discrete light stimuli serving as occasion setters in classical fear conditioning with rats. Both sham-operated and dHIPP-lesioned animals readily learned a L?T+, TÀ serial feature-positive discrimination in which a light (L) ''set the occasion" for reinforcement of a tone (T+). dHIPP-lesioned animals were deficient, however, in acquiring a similar discrimination in which different contexts (A and B) served as occasion setters, i.e., A(T+) and B(TÀ). The lesioned animals also failed to discriminate between a context in which a tone had been partially reinforced and a context in which no conditioning had taken place, whereas sham-operated animals froze more to the tone in the conditioned context than in the novel context. Collectively, the data indicate that the dorsal hippocampus is important in processing information about the signaling value of contextual, but not discrete, stimuli.
Introduction
Memories are typically separated into declarative (or explicit) memory and non-declarative (or implicit) memory systems based on information content and neuroanatomical substrates (Cohen, Eichenbaum, Deacedo, & Corkin, 1985; Schacter, 1987; Scoville & Milner, 1957; Tulving, 1972; van Strien, Cappaert, & Witter, 2009) . Declarative memories depend on the medial temporal lobe structures (such as the hippocampus and surrounding cortical areas) and are thought to comprise relatively complex information (e.g., facts and events), whereas non-declarative memories are thought to be independent of the medial temporal lobe structures and involve simple information (e.g., classical conditioning). However, in a classic study, Richard F. Thompson and colleagues (Berger, Alger, & Thompson, 1976) have demonstrated that the hippocampus is engaged even during simple classical or Pavlovian conditioning and in some cases is required (Solomon, Vander Schaaf, Thompson, & Weisz, 1986) . In this special issue of Neurobiology of Learning and Memory commemorating Richard F. Thompson's 50+ years of memory research, we present a study demonstrating the necessity of the hippocampus in Pavlovian conditioning.
In a typical Pavlovian conditioning procedure, a conditioned stimulus (CS) is contingently paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US) and comes to elicit a conditioned response (CR). While the CS is most often a discrete stimulus such as a tone or a light, it has long been recognized that the context in which conditioning occurs may itself act as a CS and form an association with the US, and thereby come to control a CR (e.g., Hull, 1943; Pavlov, 1927) . Most modern theories of Pavlovian conditioning consider context-US associations to be analogous to discrete CS-US associations both in the mechanisms by which they are formed and in the response-eliciting properties that they confer (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) . Context-US associations have proven to be useful theoretically in accounting for certain challenging observations, such as the ''reinstatement" of responding to an extinguished CS by unsignaled US presentations (Rescorla & Heth, 1975; see Bouton & King, 1983 ) and the importance of CS-US contingency in determining the amount of associative strength that accrues to a CS (see Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) .
Nevertheless, several investigators have challenged the simple conditioning view of context as insufficient to account for some of the more interesting effects of context, such as the contextdependence of various conditioning phenomena (e.g., extinction; for reviews see Bouton, 2004; Ji & Maren, 2007 ). An alternative approach holds that context may serve a modulatory or hierarchical function, in addition to directly controlling a CR, by virtue of its association with the US. Thus, a context may modulate the formation and retrieval of associations between discrete CSs and USs that are paired in its presence (e.g., Baeyens et al., 2005; Bouton, 1993 Bouton, , 2004 Hirsh, 1974 Hirsh, , 1980 Miller & Schachtman, 1985; Nadel & Willner, 1980; Spear, 1973) in a manner that is relatively independent of any context-US associations that may be assumed to exist (Bouton, 1984; Bouton & King, 1986; Bouton & Swartzentruber, 1986; Swartzentruber, 1991) .
This modulatory function of context is reminiscent of the ''occasion setting" function of discrete cues trained as features in certain
